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Recent Cases
CoN'rnAcrs-SuBcoNTIACrORS AS T~mD PARTY BENEFICIARY OF CON-
TRACT BETWEEN STATE AND ProUAE CoNTRAcro.-The L. G. Wasson
Coal Mining Corp., appellee, brought a contract action against the
Commonwealth of Kentucky. Traylor Bros., Inc., the prime contractor,
was to complete grade and drain work on a section of a highway con-
struction project. Traylor had subcontracted the borrow pit excava-
tion on a section of the project to the appellee.' The appellee claimed
that the appellant erroneously underestimated the amount of borrow
pit excavation and sought payment for such excess excavation. The
trial court upheld the appellee's cause of action on a third party
beneficiary theory. Held: Reversed. This theory was unsustainable
because the essential features of a third party beneficiary contract
were not present. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Dep't of Highways v.
L. G. Wasson Coal Mining Corp., 358 S.W.2d 347 (Ky. 1962).
Although the court correctly decided that the subcontractor could
not be considered a third party beneficiary in this case, it is unfortunate
that the court dismissed without discussion or explanation the ap-
plicability of third party beneficiary law, which was crucial to the
trial court's judgment in favor of the subcontractor.2 The only clue
the court gave as to its reasons for denying the subcontractor the
status of a third party beneficiary was its citation of Road Improvement
Dist. No. 1 v. Mobley Constr. Co.,3 an Arkansas case involving similar
facts. In that case, the court refused to recognize the subcontractor
as a third party beneficiary because such a contract does not inure to
the benefit of anyone except the prime contractor, and there was no
existing obligation of the promisor to the third party at the time of the
making of the contract. The court said, in effect, that since the sub-
IThe prime contract provided that any subcontractor would be recognized
by the Commonwealth only as an employee.
2 The court discussed more fully the other points on which it based its
reversal: (1) the subcontractor could not recover on the ground that the cross-
claim of the prime contractor against the Commonwealth was for the full amount
due, when the cross-claim sought no recovery except as was conditional upon a
recovery by the subcontractor; (2) there could be no recovery on the theory
that the making of the subcontract constituted an assignment, since the subcontract
did not purport to give the subcontractor any direct right to collect money pay-
able by the state to the prime contractor; and (3) there could be no recovery on
the theory that the prime contractor had assigned moneys due him from the state
in a previous suit, and under the established rule against splitting a cause of action
there was nothing left to assign.
3 171 Ark. 585, 286 S.W. 878 (1926).
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contractor's rights accrued subsequent to the prime contract, he was
a mere incidental beneficiary acquiring no rights thereunder.
The American majority rule is that "a third person may enforce a
promise made for his benefit even though he is a stranger to the con-
tract and to the consideration."4 Intention to confer a benefit on the
third party is essential to the right of the third party to enforce the
promise, and this applies both to the donee and the creditor bene-
ficiary.5 The real problem is to ascertain whether there exists a bona
fide intent to benefit the third party. As applied to the principal case,
the question becomes one of whether the construction contract between
the state and the contractor was entered into for the benefit of the sub-
sequent subcontractor. Previous Kentucky cases reveal a more liberal
view than that indicated by the court's approval of the reasoning in
the Arkansas case. As early as 1930, the Kentucky court allowed
damages to a plaintiff suing as third party beneficiary to an agreement
between a city and the prime contractor." The rule was stated as
follows: "[A] contract is made for the benefit of a party who has a
direct financial, legal, or equitable interest in its performance."7 In a
later case, the court held that a contract between a state and an
individual by which certain things were to be done, inured to the
benefit of the individual who was interested in its performanc. 8 The
plaintiff in that case was an employee of a subcontractor, and the prime
contract stipulated that the contractor would pay for materials and
labor. In still another case, the court upheld the rights of a third party
who had relied upon a contract made between others.9
Denying recovery by the subcontractor because there was no
existing obligation to him at the time the contract was made lacks
support in the majority of cases in Kentucky and other jurisdictions.
The creation of a right in either a donee or creditor beneficiary does
not require that he be identified when a contract containing a promise
is made.10 The third party need not be known, nor need he even be
in existence when the promise is made." It is sufficient if he be in
existence and be identified at the time when performance of the
promise is due. How then can an existing obligation to a third party
4 12 Am. Jur. Contracts § 277 (1938).
5 Simpson, Contracts 307 (1954).
o Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Wadsworth Elec. Mfg. Co., 234 Ky. 645, 29 S.W.2d
650 (1980).
7 Id. at 649, 29 S.W.2d at 652.
8 J. T. Jackson Lumber Co. v. Union Transfer & Storage Co., 246 Ky. 653,
55 S.W.2d 670 (1932).
9 Morrison v. Payton, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 992, 104 S.W. 685 (1907).
'0 Restatement, Contracts § 139 (1932).
1 Traver v. Snyder, 35 Misc. 261, 71 N.Y.S. 761 (1901).
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be required when it is not even required, that the third party be in
existence?
It can be argued that the subcontractor in the principal case was
one who had a financial interest in or had relied upon the prime
contract. Furthermore, the fact that there was no existing obligation
from the contracting parties to this particular subcontractor at the time
of the contract's execution is irrelevant. The reasons given by the
Arkansas court, therefore, do not explain satisfactorily why the sub-
contractor fails to achieve the status of a third party beneficiary. The
most satisfactory explanation for denying him this status is that the
contract contained no express provisions stipulating that either of the
contracting parties would be liable for damages to a subcontractor.
Courts generally refuse to imply such a provision in cases of this
nature.12 The law governing this point can be more clearly understood
by considering the construction contract cases in which a bond is given
by the contractor requiring him to pay for all materials and labor. As
the Kentucky court has said:
We have in Kentucky two distinct lines of decisions in cases of this
character. If the bond, when read in connection with the contract, con-
tains a provision obligating the contractor to pay for the material, or to
compensate the laborers, it constitutes a provision for the benefit of the
laborers and material-men.... On the other hand, when the bond is
one solely to secure performance of the contract and contains no language
from which an express covenant for the benefit of third parties may be
derived, an action thereon by a stranger to the contract may not be
maintained.' 3
According to the weight of authority, a person furnishing materials
or labor may recover on a building contractor's bond where it contains
a condition for his benefit.'4 But where neither the contract nor the
bond contains a provision for payment of labor and materials, there
can be no action by the subcontractor on the third party beneficiary
theory.15
3
2 1n Road Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Mobley Constr. Co., supra note 3,
the Arkansas court quoted from an earlier case, Dickenson v. McCoppin, 121 Ark.
414, 181 S.W. 151 (1915):
Where a contract is made between a promisee and a promisor for the
benefit of a third party, in order that the third party may sue the
promisor for a breach of the contract, the obligation of the promisor to
the third party must be one ... which grew out of the contract itself....
This language indicates that the third party beneficiary could not be sustained
without an express provision in the contract allowing damages to the subcon-
tractor. But instead of using this approach, the court based its decision on tie
fact that there was no existing obligation to the third party at the time of the
contracet's execution.
13Standard Oil Co. v. National Surety Co., 234 Ky. 764, 766-767, 29
S.W.2d 29, 30 (1930).
149 Am. Jur. Building and Construction Contracts § 95 (1937).




If a subcontractor cannot recover as a third party beneficiary under
a contractor's bond because it contains no provision for his benefit, a
fortiori, he cannot recover under such a contract without bond for the
same reason. The general rule is that where a contract for public work
has been let without obtaining from the contractor the statutory bond,
there is no liability to the subcontractor.16 Since the contract between
the state and the prime contractor contained no express provision for
the benefit of the subcontractor, the court in the principal case
correctly decided that the subcontractor was not a third party bene-
ficiary. For this reason, the subcontractors action fails, and not, as
suggested in the Arkansas case, because of the absence of an existing
obligation to him at the time the prime contract was executed.
Tommy W. Chandler
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-Real estate brokers in Detroit brought action to enjoin the enforce-
ment of a rule of the Michigan Corporation and Securities Commis-
sion,1 which prohibited discrimination by real estate brokers, sales-
men, and agents because of race, color, religion, ethnic origin or
ancestry.2 The commission is authorized by the legislature to revoke
a real estate broker's license for dishonest and unfair dealings and to
enumerate additional grounds of such conduct and "make rules in
harmony with the subject matter legislated upon."4
The basis of the action is that the commission had exceeded its
rule-making power. The Commission and amici curiae 5 contended that,
because of the vital importance to the state of the functions performed
by the licensed real estate brokers, discrimination on the basis of race,
color, creed or ancestry constitutes discriminatory state action in viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment by not affirmatively prohibiting
such practice. The circuit court decreed the injunction sought and the
16 Annot., 64 A.L.R. 678 (1929).
1 For a discussion of the rule which is the subject of this litigation, see
Kinsey, Rule Nine-A Novel Approach?, 39 U. Det. L.J. 108 (1961).
2 The commission is vested with responsibility for enforcing provisions of the
Michigan statute which regulates licensed real estate agents and brokers.
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 19.794 (1959).3 Mich. Stat. Ann. § 19.794 (1959).
4 Ranke v. Corporation and Securities Commission, 317 Mich. 304, 26 N.W.2d
898 (1947).5 American Jewish Congress, American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan,
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, American Jewish
Committee, and the Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai B'rith.
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